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Abstract
In a marvelous but somewhat neglected paper, ’The Corporation: Will It Be
Managed by Machines?’ Herbert Simon articulated from the perspective of 1960
his vision of what we now call the New Economy the machine-aided system of
production and management of the late twentieth century. Simon’s analysis sprang
from what I term the principle of cognitive comparative advantage: one has to understand the quite different cognitive structures of humans and machines (including computers) in order to explain and predict the tasks to which each will be most
suited. Perhaps unlike Simon’s better-known predictions about progress in artificial intelligence research, the predictions of this 1960 article hold up remarkably
well and continue to offer important insights. ¡P¿In what follows I attempt to tell
a coherent story about the evolution of machines and the division of labor between
humans and machines. Although inspired by Simon’s 1960 paper, I weave many
other strands into the tapestry, from classical discussions of the division of labor
to present-day evolutionary psychology. The basic conclusion is that, with growth
in the extent of the market, we should see humans ’crowded into’ tasks that call
for the kinds of cognition for which humans have been equipped by biological
evolution. These human cognitive abilities range from the exercise of judgment in
situations of ambiguity and surprise to more mundane abilities in spatio-temporal
perception and locomotion. Conversely, we should see machines ’crowded into’
tasks with a well-defined structure. This conclusion is not based (merely) on a
claim that machines, including computers, are specialized idiots-savants today
because of the limits (whether temporary or permanent) of artificial intelligence;
rather, it rests on a claim that, for what are broadly ’economic’ reasons, it will
continue to make economic sense to create machines that are idiots-savants.

Introduction.
I had the chance to interact with Herbert Simon on only one occasion. But the
circumstances were somewhat exotic. Simon and I were among a number of
Western scholars invited to a conference in Warsaw in 1988, the year before
everything changed. The objective of the conference was to interact with Polish
scholars — philosophers, mostly — on the theme of “praxeology,” the study of
human action. I have vivid memories of sitting at a small table in our shabby
hotel drinking terrible Romanian wine and listening to Simon and Donald
McCloskey debating the merits of deconstructionism.

(McCloskey thought

deconstructionism had much to contribute; Simon thought it was the stupidest
thing he had ever heard of.)

I also remember Simon’s general intellectual

engagement and wide-ranging interests. He was the only one among us who
made an attempt at the Polish language, and he tied to speak to people from his
phrasebook whenever he could.
This encounter largely confirmed for me the impression of the man I had
gained from reading his work over the years: a searching intellect, great
originality, and a willingness to take strong and clear positions. I hope that all
these attributes will also show through in this essay, which takes as its reading
one of the more obscure works in the Simonian canon. In 1960, the editors of a
volume challenged Simon to answer this question: “The Corporation: Will It Be
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Managed by Machines?”1 In this marvelous but somewhat neglected paper, he
articulated his vision of what the “knowledge economy” of the future — 1985! —
would look like. Perhaps surprisingly for someone given to the most strident
predictions of the speedy and inevitable success of artificial intelligence, Simon
in this article is clear that computers and humans have fundamentally different
cognitive comparative advantages.
[M]an's comparative advantage in energy production has been
greatly reduced in most situations -- to the point where he is no
longer a significant source of power in our economy. He has been
supplanted also in performing many relatively simple and
repetitive eye-brain-hand sequences. He has retained his greatest
comparative advantage in: (1) the use of his brain as a flexible
general-purpose problem-solving device, (2) the flexible use of his
sensory organs and hands, and (3) the use of his legs, on rough
terrain as well as smooth, to make this general-purpose sensingthinking-manipulating system available wherever it is needed.
(Simon 1960, p. 31.)
In what follows I explore this notion of cognitive comparative advantage and use
it to tell what (I hope) is a coherent story about the evolution of machines and of
the division of labor between humans and machines. Although inspired by
Simon’s 1960 paper, my account weaves many additional strands into a tapestry
of my own design, from classical discussions of the division of labor to presentday evolutionary psychology. I touch both on the history of what has been said
about humans and machines and on the often fiery debates in artificial
intelligence – debates in which Simon was so prominent. But I do not take on the

1

The volume was intended to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Graduate
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difficult task of assessing and appraising those weighty topics comprehensively
and fairly.
In the end, my basic conclusion is broadly consistent with that in Simon’s
1960 paper. With growth in the extent of the market, we should see humans
“crowded into” tasks that call for the kinds of cognition for which humans have
been equipped by biological evolution. These human cognitive abilities range
from the exercise of judgment in situations of ambiguity and surprise to more
mundane abilities in spatio-temporal perception and locomotion.

This

conclusion is not based (merely) on a claim that machines, including computers,
are specialized idiots-savants today because of the limits (whether temporary or
permanent) of artificial intelligence; rather, it rests on a claim that, for what are
broadly “economic” reasons, it will continue to make sense to create machines
that are idiots-savants.

The division of labor.
At least since the first Industrial Revolution, people have pondered the
relationship between humans and machines. How will machines change life and
work?

How will they change the role of humans?

Although many have

conceptualized the interaction between human and machine as a progressive
displacement of the former by the latter, writers like Adam Smith and Charles
Babbage envisaged a far more complex relationship.

School of Industrial Administration at what was then Carnegie Tech.
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In Smith’s account, production is a matter of discrete tasks or stages, each
with its own set of specialized tools. Under the sort of crafts production that
precedes the division of labor, the artisan masters and coordinates multiple
stages of production and wields a variety of specialized tools. As growth in the
extent of the market makes it economical to subdivide labor, the artisans begins
to specialize in a smaller subset of operations and tools. To do this, the artisan
must now cooperate with other artisans in a more carefully orchestrated way.
Workers become complements to one another rather than substitutes
(Leijonhufvud 1986). And the coordination function that the artisans themselves
once supplied must now be hardwired to a greater degree into the spatial and
temporal “interfaces” among specialized operations and specialized operatives.
Each operative must make his or her output relatively standardized so that the
next operative down the line knows what to expect; and each operative must
hand over that output at a predictable time, lest buffer inventories run dry and
the entire production process come to a crashing halt.
Smith attributed the benefits of this organizational transformation to three
sources: “first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly,
to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of
work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines
which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of
many” (Smith 1976, I.i.5).
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The first source is clearly cognitive.2

By narrowing their focus, the

operatives are able to deepen their skills through learning by doing. Writing a
few decades after Smith, Charles Babbage recognized the larger cognitive
implications: that the division of labor applies to mental operations in general as
much to as to mechanical ones.

He recounts the story of the French

mathematician Prony, who stumbled across a copy of the Wealth of Nations and
suddenly realized that he could use the division of labor to calculate logarithm
tables3 (Babbage 1835, chapter 20).

Babbage goes further, suggesting that a

machine might take over from humans not only mechanical tasks but some of
these intellectual tasks as well. What he had in mind, of course, was the neverfinished “analytical engine” often hailed as the first computer. (Machines as
information processors is major theme to which we will return.)

2

Although not perhaps obvious at first, the benefits of less switching among tasks is also at
base a cognitive matter, as Henrik Houtthaker explains. “The indivisibility of the individual
consists in the fact that, although it may be capable of a great many different activities, it can
perform only few activities simultaneously because most activities utilize the same resources
and more particularly that coordinating resource which is known as the brain. The larger
the number of simultaneous activities, the greater the difficulty of coordinating them and of
carrying out each one properly, and the smaller therefore the output from each activity.
This applies not only to simultaneous activities, but also to activities that are spread out
over time. In the first place some shorter or longer interval is usually needed to switch from
one activity to another; in the second place it is usually easier to perform activities that are
known from previous experience than to perform them for the first time. All this, the
economist will note at once, can be put in terms of increasing returns. We have increasing
returns to the extent that, if several activities are replaced by a single one, there is less need
for coordination and switching time and more scope for acquiring experience. The output of
the single activity may thus be raised above the combined outputs of the several activities”
(Houthakker 1956, p. 182).

3

Ironic indeed that the French needed Smith to teach them the division of labor, since Smith
lifted his account of the making of pins from the French Encyclopédie.
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As an adherent to the British empiricist tradition — and as a good friend
of David Hume — Smith believed that the mind starts out as essentially a tabula
rasa and that differences in ability are the result of learning and not of any innate
abilities.4 But what if people are born with innately different abilities? Babbage
pointed out that nature provides as much support for the division of labor as
does nurture: unlike crafts production, the division of labor permits tasks to be
allocated according to (innate) comparative advantage.5 This famous principle of
optimal resource allocation had lately been discovered by David Ricardo. It
insists that allocation to tasks should be based not on who is absolutely better at
the task but on who is relatively better. If person A is better than person B at both
management and secretarial work, it may yet pay to assign B all the secretarial
work if A is relatively better (is “more better,” we might say) at management.6 If

4

“The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware
of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions,
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of
the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from
nature, as from habit, custom, and education” (Smith 1976, I.ii.4).

5

“We have seen, then, that the effect of the division of labour, both in mechanical and in
mental operations, is, that it enables us to purchase and apply to each process precisely that
quantity of skill and knowledge which is required for it: we avoid employing any part of the
time of a man who can get eight or ten shillings a day by his skill in tempering needles, in
turning a wheel, which can be done for sixpence a day; and we equally avoid the loss arising
from the employment of an accomplished mathematician in performing the lowest processes
of arithmetic” (Babbage 1835, Section II, Chapter 20, paragraph 250.)

6

Those who remember their Principles of Economics know that “more better” has a precise
interpretation in terms of the slopes of production-possibilities curves.
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one takes a middle-ground position in the nature-nurture debate, then clearly the
division of labor offers benefits of both the Smith and Babbage kinds.7
Smith’s third source of benefits from the division of labor brings us finally
to the topic of machines. By concentrating their attention more narrowly on a
smaller set of operations, he feels, operatives will naturally tend to invent devices
that makes them more productive. The reason that specialized workers are able
to perceive opportunities to successfully mechanize (parts of) their tasks is that,
in narrowing the range of tasks and in standardizing the interfaces between
tasks, the division of labor makes the work more routine.8 It is a major theme of
this essay that the human worker may need to retain discretion over some
operations while delegating the most routine ones to machines. Nonetheless, in
the pure Smithian model of the division of labor, the humans themselves become
increasingly machine-like.
In the limit, this amounts to what Charles Sabel (1982) has branded
fordism.

It was not really until the early twentieth century that tools and

machining techniques were precise enough to allow genuine standardization of

7

Phrased this way, it is hard to disagree with the proposition that both nature and nurture
matter. As I will suggest below, the issue once again becomes controversial as soon as one
asks for specifics.

8

“It is generally agreed that Adam Smith, when he suggested that the division of labour leads
to inventions because workmen engaged in specialised routine operations come to see better
ways of accomplishing the same results, missed the main point. The important thing, of
course, is that with the division of labour a group of complex processes is transformed into a
succession of simpler processes, some of which, at least, lend themselves to the use of
machinery” (Young 1928, p. 530).
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parts (Hounshell 1984).

Such standardization enabled Henry Ford to take

Smithian factory production to a new level by means of the moving assembly
line and related techniques, which he and his engineering staff had begun
implementing by 1913. The Ford assembly process was above all a system, one
designed by specialized engineers rather than by the workers themselves. (This
is of course another manifestation of the division of labor: the design of
production becomes itself a specialized task.9) The system effected a complete
redesign of production, breaking operations into simple sequences of routine
activity that yielded standardized subassemblies.
By transferring control of systemic issues from the workers to engineers
and industrial designers, fordism, in the phrase popularized by Stephen Marglin
(1974), had rendered workers deskilled.10 We need look no further than Smith
himself for the dire implications of what fordist production would mean for the
worker: “The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple
operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the

9

“All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of
those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the
ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a
peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation,
whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that
account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and
dissimilar objects. In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every
other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of
citizens.” (Smith 1976, I.i.9, p. 21).

10

Of course, Marx noticed this long ago. “Intelligence in production expands in one direction,
because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in
the capital that employs them” (Marx 1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XIV, p. 361). On this
see also Braverman (1974).
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same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in
finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become” (Smith 1976, V.i.178).

Mechanization.
For many, notably those intent on criticizing capitalist work organization, this is
pretty nearly the end of the story. In fact, however, it is actually much nearer to
the middle of the story. Recall Smith’s assumptions. Tools start out specialized
to the various activities involved in production, but labor is unspecialized. The
division of labor consists in matching the specialization of labor to that of
machines. But this doesn’t exhaust the possibilities. Why can’t machines change
their level of specialization? (Ames and Rosenberg 1965).

-9-

When workers specialize, they reduce the range of activities in which they
engage; but, if Smith is right, they also become more competent at the activities
that remain. Specializing workers thus trade wide skills for deep skills. Let us
for the moment take skill to mean the first concept, skill widening instead of skill

a1

Three activities:

Technology. Workers. Machines.

A

1

a2

a3

Labor
Machine
specialization. specialization.

3

1/3

1

Crafts
production.
Smithian
division of
labor.

B

3

3

1

1

C

1

1

1

1/3

Volume
effect.

Figure 1 Labor and machine specialization.
Source: Ames and Rosenberg (1965).

deepening. Define skill as the number of activities an operative or machine
engages in.11 Clearly, a crafts artisan is more skilled in this sense than a fordist
assembly-line worker. Define specialization as the reciprocal of skill: the number
of doers (humans or machines) per activity. By this definition, specialization
ranges between 0 (complete non-specialization) and 1 (complete specialization).
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Now consider a production process involving exactly three activities (a1, a2, a3).
The result is a set of possibilities summarized in figure 1. Technology A is what
we called crafts production. One worker undertakes all three activities, but
machines — which are clearly tools in this case — are specialized to activities.
Technology B is what Smith had in mind:

workers and tools are equally

specialized to activities. Technology 3 is the forgotten alternative: workers are
specialized, but machines — and now they are indeed machines not just tools —
become less specialized.
What it means for the machines to become less specialized is that a single
device has taken over — has automated — all three stages of production. Many
have traditionally conceptualized such automation as a natural extension of the
division of labor: each worker wields specialized tools, and automation is just a
matter of hooking the relevant tools together (and typically connecting them to
inanimate power) so that they run by themselves.12 As we will see, however,
creating skilled machines typically involves redesigning the work process, often
in a radical way, so that it meets the needs of machine cognition. As a result, the
process may no longer look a lot like a robotic version of the human division of

11

The remainder of this paragraph follows Ames and Rosenberg (1965), who offer a more
careful definition of terms than I attempt here.

12

Charles Babbage, for example: “When each process has been reduced to the use of some
simple tool, the union of all these tools, actuated by one moving power, constitutes a
machine” (Babbage 1835, Chapter 19, Paragraph 225). Similarly Karl Marx, who probably
got the idea from Babbage: “The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being
set in motion, performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the
workman with similar tools” (Marx 1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XIV, p. 374).
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labor. At the risk of drawing a distinction too sharply, we might say that a tool is
a device that amplifies human skill applied directly to tasks, whereas a machine is
a device that takes over (often integrated) tasks from the humans, who – as we
will see – then direct their skills to tending, maintaining, and designing the
machine rather than directly to the production process. A carpenter today still
assembles a house with tools, even if those tools are now driven by small electric
motors; but plywood is made by a machine. In effect, tools amplify human
abilities – both mechanical and cognitive – without fundamentally changing the
division of labor.
Machines are another matter. Smith tells us that growth in the extent of
the market drives the progressive transition from Technology A to Technology B.
But such growth also — and perhaps more importantly — drives a transition
from Technology B to Technology C, which we can understand as a further
manifestation of the larger division of labor with which Smith was concerned
(Langlois 1999a, 1999b).

One can see this point illustrated dramatically by

visiting the Match Museum in the town of Jönköping, Sweden, which was the
“match capital of the world” for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.

In the beginning, the industry took precisely the form Smith

predicted.

Cottagers in the town and surrounding countryside assumed a

variety of subdivided tasks, from chopping and cutting the match wood to
folding and gluing match boxes to the debilitating and ultimately gruesome task
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of coating the tips with chemicals.13 But what thrust Jönköping to prominence in
the industry was not a finer subdivision of putting-out tasks; rather, it was
mechanization.

In 1844, the brothers Johan and Carl Lundström opened a

factory in Jönköping to capitalize on the recently invented safety match,
improvements to which Johan had just patented. In 1870 they hired the inventor
Alexander Lagerman to further mechanize the process of making matches.
Lagerman’s machines not only assumed the tasks of humans but — more
significantly —combined within their operations what had been many
previously separate tasks, and they did so in a way that often differed
dramatically from the unmechanized sequence of tasks.14
If mechanization takes tasks entirely out of the hands of workers, are we
left to infer, with Marx, that the progress of mechanization will inevitably
relegate humans to an immiserated proletarian army of the unskilled and
unemployed? The histories of the most-developed countries clearly demonstrate

13

Which produced phosphorus necrosis in the workers. The transition to the safety match
after 1844 had the happy effect of substituting less-toxic red phosphorus for the more
dangerous yellow phosphorus (Karlsson 1996).

14

A more familiar example illustrates the productivity gains to be had from this process.
Adam Smith (1976, I.1.3) describes the manufacture of pins in his day, in which ten men,
organized according to principles of the division of labor, could make about 48,000 pins a
day, or almost 5,000 per person per day. By Marx’s era, making pins was already the
business of machines, and a single machine could crank out 145,000 a day. One woman or
girl could supervise four machines, which means almost 600,000 per person per day (Marx
1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XV, Section 8, p 460). As of 1980, one person could
supervise 24 machines, each making 500 pins a minute, or about 6 million pins per person
per day (Pratten 1980). That’s a two orders of magnitude increase in productivity in the first
century as machines replaced the division of hand labor but only (!) a single order of
magnitude increase in productivity over the next century as machines improved.
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otherwise.

But there are also theoretical reasons to see mechanization as

producing quite a different and rather more benignant role for humans.15
In Figure 3, the human worker is still specialized, because he or she does
only one thing. But that one thing is not any of the original activities; instead, it
is the new activity of minding the machine. The invention of the power loom in
1787 increased productivity over the hand loom not only because it could weave
faster (by the mid 1820s, at any rate) but because a single person, who was no
longer providing the motive power, could operate more than one loom16 (Landes
1969, p. 86). Of course, we might well view ”tending the machine” not as a
single specialized activity but as a complex set of activities – perhaps more
complex than the crafts activities the machine displaced.

When automatic

telephone switches replaced the activities of human switchboard operators,
machine tending fell to highly trained technicians and (later) programmers. The
backhoe, which replaced the activities of human ditch-diggers, required an
operator with greater skill than any pick-and-shovel worker (Robertson and
Alston 1992, p. 336). In the telephony case, technological change increased the

15

In this respect, Alfred Marshall was closer to the mark than Marx. Machinery, he writes,
“constantly supplants and renders unnecessary that purely manual skill, the attainment of
which was, even up to Adam Smith's time, the chief advantage of division of labour. But
this influence is more than countervailed by its tendency to increase the scale of
manufactures and to make them more complex; and therefore to increase the opportunities
for division of labour of all kinds, and especially in the matter of business management”
(Marshall 1961, IV.ix.3).

16

Landes (1969, p. 86) reports that “in 1833, a young man with a twelve-year old assistant
could run four looms and turn out as much as twenty times the output of a hand worker.”
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skill of workers because, as machines took over the more routine tasks, there
remained (or were generated) certain complementary tasks to which machines
are ill suited and that thus required the ministrations of skilled humans. In the
backhoe case, technological change did not lead to a significant redesign of the
work process. Instead, more-skilled machines not only aided humans in a skilled
activity but actually called forth higher skill in the humans. Thus both skillenhancing and skill-displacing technical change can be complementary to human
skill.

Coordination and buffering.
As we saw, production is largely a matter of the coordination among
tasks.17 And coordination means that each stage must somehow do the right
things at the right time: each stage must make decisions that are appropriate in
light of the decisions that came before and will come after. A crafts artisan is
constantly interacting with and fiddling with the process of production at each
step. But when labor is more finely divided, parts become standardized, and
much of the coordination among stages is designed into the process.18 What

Two looms may have been a more typical assignment, however, until the last quarter of the
nineteenth century.
17

“Production,” of course, means more than “making things” in the narrow sense and
encompasses all the economic tasks necessary to get a product or service into the hands of
the consumer. Indeed, the consumer may also need to engage in some “production” in
order to be able to consume (Langlois and Coşgel 1998).

18

Clearly, increases in the extent of the market make batch production more feasible. In a
sufficiently large market, there is a demand for many instances of an identical object, which
means, broadly speaking, that the production process for making the object will need to
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limits the use of such hard-wired coordination is the complexity and
unpredictability of the environment. If a square hole awaits on the assembly
line, the production process will work smoothly only if what arrives is always a
square peg — and never a round peg, let alone a whale or a bowl of petunias.
Indeed, the higher the throughput of a production system, the more vulnerable
the system is to spurious variation. If a round peg appears when a square one is
wanted, the entire system may come to a crashing halt.
As Simon tells us, there are fundamentally only two ways to deal with an
unpredictable environment. “If we want an organism or mechanism to behave
effectively in a complex and changing environment, we can design into it
adaptive mechanisms that allow it to respond flexibly to the demands the
environment places on it. Alternatively, we can try to simplify and stabilize the
environment.

We can adapt organism to environment or environment to

organism.” (Simon 1960, p. 33.) Consider the problem of crossing rough terrain
—most of the American continent in the early nineteenth century, for example.
Like the native Americans before them, the earliest western explorers used
Simon’s first technique: they took advantage of the adaptive mechanism of the

make many of the same decisions over and over again. In this respect, we can think of the
move to high-volume production as a reduction in variety in the cybernetic sense (Ashby
1956). This is implicit in most discussions of dominant designs and innovative regimes (for
example Abernathy and Utterback 1978), in which innovation stops being a matter of the
trying out of many qualitatively different alternatives and becomes a matter of refining a
single alternative. In the language of James March (1991), high-volume production reflects a
transition from exploration to exploitation. As I will suggest eventually, even the phenomenon
of so-called mass customization is not an exception.
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human locomotion system.

They walked and climbed, at least when there

weren’t suitable rivers available. But once population began gravitating west, it
became worthwhile to use the second approach. A steam locomotive is a highthroughput transportation system that works phenomenally well so long as one
first prepares the environment in order to reduce variation almost to zero. So the
railroad companies altered the terrain — they laid tracks — to accommodate this
high-speed, high-volume, but inflexible technology.
A fordist assembly line is like a railroad. It increases throughput by
eliminating variation, and thus makes itself vulnerable to whatever variation
remains. It is for this reason that such systems need to buffer environmental
influences (Thompson 1967, p. 20) by placing human information processors
between the uncertainty and the high-throughput production process. At the
same time that fordism “deskills” assembly-line workers by making their tasks
simpler and more routine, it also surrounds those workers (or the machines that
inevitably take on the most simple and routine tasks) with a large number of
more flexible (more widely skilled) workers at multiple levels — from
maintenance workers to top management.19 Uncertainty and variation can never

19

“There will generally be a separate set of skilled manual work departments (maintenance,
tool and die making, and special departments that vary with the technology, such as the
crew who lay firebricks inside steel furnaces) and skilled staff workers at the managerial
levels (engineering, quality control and inspection, scheduling and inventory).”
(Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64).
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be eliminated; at best they can be pushed “up the hierarchy” to be dealt with by
adaptable and less-specialized humans.
As Stinchcombe (1990) sees it, these human “buffers” are informationprocessing systems that mediate between a complex and uncertain environment
and the system in need of predictability.20 Human cognition can often interpret
complex data from the external world and translate that data into the kinds of
routine information the productive system can use. For example, a professor
translates the complex information on an essay exam into a letter grade that the
Registrar’s office can process; a physician translates the complex inputs from
observation and medical instrumentation into a diagnosis, which results in a
relatively unambiguous set of instructions for nurses, pharmacists, patients, etc.

Human versus machine.
The first industrial revolution improved productivity by assigning the task of
providing motive power to inanimate sources like water and steam. The hand
weaver became a loom tender. At the same time, machines also began to take
over some “relatively simple and repetitive eye-brain-hand sequences” (Simon
1960, p. 31). To the extent that production had been (or could be) laid out as a

20

Frank Knight agrees. “In industrial life,” he writes, “purely routine operations are inevitably
taken over by machinery. The duties of the machine tender may seem mechanical and
uniform, but they are really not so throughout the operation. His function is to complete the
carrying-out of the process to the point where it becomes entirely uniform so that the
machine can take hold of it, or else to begin with the uniform output of the machine and
start it on the way of diversification. Some part of the task will practically always be found
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sequence of simple coordinated steps, a machine could perform the steps
(perhaps in a slightly different way or in a different sequence) with greater speed
and precision. The specialized Smithian match maker gave way to the matchmaking machine. In the computer era, and especially in the last quarter century,
machines have become faster not only at repetitive sequences of tasks in general
but at repetitive calculations in particular.
“information processing.”

We often call such calculation

If, as I’ve argued, the human ability to buffer

variation is a matter of information processing, will the computer eventually take
over from the human buffers — including managers?
What makes this question especially intriguing is that Simon was a
champion for the position that abstract symbol manipulation is the essence of
thinking, and thus that computers, which manipulate symbols, can in principle
be designed to think like humans (Newell and Simon 1961). So we might expect
to find Simon suggesting the opposite: that computers will surely begin to outdo
humans in many if not all areas involving “information processing.” In one
sense, this was indeed Simon’s view. He makes the characteristically bold claim
that,
because we can now write complex information-processing
programs for computers, we are acquiring the technical capacity to
replace humans with computers in a rapidly widening range of
‘thinking’ and ‘deciding’ tasks. Closely allied to the development
to require conscious judgment, which is to say the meeting of uncertainty, the exercise of
responsibility, in the ordinary sense of these terms.” (Knight 1921, III.X.7, pp. 294-295.)
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of complex information-processing techniques for general-purpose
computers is the rapid advance in the technique of automating all
sorts of production and clerical tasks. Putting these two lines of
development together, I am led to the following general
predictions: Within the very near future — much less than twentyfive years — we shall have the technical capability of substituting
machines for any and all human functions in organizations. Within
the same period, we shall have acquired an extensive and
empirically tested theory of human cognitive processes and their
interaction with human emotions, attitudes, and values (Simon
1960, p. 22).
One way to resolve the apparent paradox is to remember that Simon’s
argument is based comparative advantage rather than absolute advantage.
Under this logic, assignment to tasks is not a matter of who is better but, as we
saw, of who is “more better.” Just as it might be efficient to assign person B all
the secretarial work even if A is better at both executive work and secretarial
work, it might be efficient to assign to humans the tasks of flexible response and
“buffering” even if computers are absolutely better at them, so long as computers
are “more better” at routine and well-defined activities. As Simon puts it, to
predict that humans will have the ability to make “thinking and deciding”
machines “says nothing of how we shall use them.” Instead, economics -- not
any inherent limits to AI – will determine the division of labor between humans
and machines.

“Thus, if computers are a thousand times faster than book-

keepers in doing arithmetic, but only one hundred times faster than
stenographers in taking dictation, we shall expect the number of bookkeepers per
thousand employees to decrease but the number of stenographers to increase.
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Similarly, if computers are a hundred times faster than executives in making
investment decisions, but only ten times faster in handling employee grievances
(the quality of the decisions being held constant), then computers will be
employed in making investment decisions, while executives will be employed in
handling grievances” (Simon 1960, p. 25).
There are many, of course, who would find this a singularly unsatisfying
resolution, since it avoids the sturm und drang of the well-documented
controversy over artificial intelligence. At one side of the debate, Simon always
resolutely upheld the strongest version of the thesis that computers can in
principle — and will soon in fact — be capable of essentially any cognitive task
now undertaken by humans.

At the other extreme have stood critics like

Dreyfus (1979), who contend that human brains and computers work in very
different ways, that the computer is not a good model of human cognition, and
that computers will never be able to do what human brains can do. Simon’s
proclivity for the outrageous prediction has helped keep this pot boiling. My
contention is that, far from sidestepping this debate, a bit of economic reasoning
(of which the principle of comparative advantage is but one aspect) helps to
clarify the issues – and indeed to demonstrate that the debate as it usually plays
out is ill posed and misleading.
Clearly, the design of machines is importantly an economic matter. It
pays to subdivide labor or mechanize production only when production runs are
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large enough. What may be less obvious is that the human machine is also in
many respects a response to economic forces. The human brain (and the human
being more generally) is an evolved product, and therefore one whose design
reflects tradeoffs motivated by resource constraints. The field of evolutionary
psychology (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1994; Pinker 1997) takes as a background
premise that, like computers, human beings are information-processing
machines, albeit ones designed by natural selection rather than by humans.21 For
scientists in this tradition, understanding the human mind involves “reverse
engineering” the brain in light of the evolutionary problem or problems to which
that brain proved to be a solution. The mind is thus a computer, designed for the
manipulation of symbols; but is also a particular kind of machine, one designed
for specific circumstances rather than for pure symbol manipulation in the
manner of the digital computer.
Broadly speaking, the crucible of human cognition was the entire legacy of
evolution, but critically the last 50,000 years, most of which our ancestors spent
as hunter-gatherers. In this reading, evolution produced a mind well adapted to
the needs of that lifestyle. Recall that, for Simon, human comparative advantage
lies in two areas: (a) sensory, manipulative, and locomotive tasks and (b)
problem-solving and decision-making tasks. Both of these sets of capabilities
came in handy to the hunter-gatherers, and the two are probably interrelated
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As many writers have pointed out, these design processes may not in the end be so very
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both physiologically and in terms of evolutionary trajectory. An upright posture
had its advantages, as did the sensitive ability to recognize objects and patterns
and to grasp tools and other objects effectively. Having these skills required
humans to develop amazingly complex robotics hardware and software.
But human problem-solving and decision-making abilities may have been
even more crucial. Humans succeeded by seizing the cognitive niche (Tooby and
DeVore 1987). In evolutionary competition, species evolve distinctive traits to
gain advantage. Their competitors – including their predators and their prey –
must rely on evolution to counter that advantage. If lions become faster, zebra
cannot immediately improve their agility or their camouflage. Not so humans.
Like the Borg on Star Trek, they can quickly analyze and adapt to the offensive
and defensive weapons of competitors. And they can do so on a time scale that
is extraordinary short by evolutionary standards. This ability to learn, adapt,
and solve problems in a creative way enabled humans to colonize and master
virtually every kind of environment and every part of the planet. What made
this success possible was the development of complex symbol-manipulation
hardware and software, including language and the ability to amplify individual
cognition through culture (Donald 1991).
To Simon, sensory recognition, manipulation, and locomotion constitute
the harder problem. “We are much further from replacing the eyes, the hands,

different (Nelson and Nelson 2002).
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and the legs” (Simon 1960, p. 32). Despite some progress, we are still far from
duplicating human perceptual-motor abilities more than 40 years after Simon
wrote. But what about problem solving and decision making? Simon offered his
characteristically bold prediction.

“Duplicating the problem-solving and

information-handling capabilities of the brain is not far off; it would be
surprising if it were not accomplished within the next decade” (Simon 1960, p.
32). We all remember the seventies for many things, but one of them is not the
creation of computers that “duplicate” human cognitive skills. Indeed, that may
or may not have happened yet, depending on what one wants to count as
“duplicating.”22
So, was Simon wrong? Again, I think the language of “prediction” and
“duplication” obscures the real issues, which are that (a) human brains and
computers are different machines with different designs and (b) what kinds of
information-processing machines get designed will depend on economic
considerations. (More on that below) Moreover, that computers can’t (yet?)
duplicate human abilities in creative decision making and open-ended problem
solving is not so much a matter of the failure of computers as it is a reflection of
the success of the human brain.

22

In a 1994 interview in Omni magazine (and presumably elsewhere), Simon held that all of
his predictions had come true except for the famous assertion that a computer would beat
the human chess champion – and that one was off by only a factor of 4.
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It is a staple of fiction that computers and robots are literal minded. When
secret agent Maxwell Smart tells his android assistant Hymie to “kill the lights,”
Hymie pulls out a gun a shoots the light bulb. In fact, computers are literal
minded at a much more fundamental level.

The reason is that they are

completely general symbol-manipulation engines. This can obviously be a great
advantage. But it also poses the disadvantage that computers do not find ready
at hand all the prepackaged pieces of information and all the purpose-built
learning and processing systems we take for granted as “common sense.” In
cognitive science, this difficulty falls under the heading of the frame problem.
We all have an idea of what it means for tasks to be simple or easy. It
turns out that what is simple or easy for a human may be damned hard for
another kind of cognitive system. Reaching into the refrigerator and picking out
an egg is easy — if you are a human not a mechanical robotic arm. Similarly,
going to the same refrigerator to make a midnight snack (to use Dennett’s
example) is trivial for a human but a daunting piece of decision-making for a
computer. The reason is that humans have a complex set of tacit understandings
and expectations — some learned, some no doubt built in — that circumscribe
the decision-making problem by excluding much of what is logically possible but
irrelevant23 (Dennett 1998). People jump to conclusions and engage in other
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Phenomenological approaches to human action have long understood the importance of
background understandings and experience, what Schütz and Luckmann (1973, p. 99) call
the “stock of knowledge.” It is this stock of knowledge that allows the agent to interpret
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kinds of cognitive “cheating.” This allows them to solve not only problems that
would be impossibly complex for an axiomatic system but even problems that
are overdetermined and thus have no unique analytic solution (Pinker 1997).
Of course, Simon has also insisted that humans engage in a certain kind of
cognitive “cheating.”

Because of the limitations of the human information-

processing system, humans suffer from “bounded rationality.” As a result, they
must rely on heuristics, simplified rules that can find an approximate solution to a
complex problem at a relatively lower cost of computation.24 What has always
seemed significant to me, however, is that Simon framed the notions of bounded
rationality and heuristics in terms of the model of axiomatic general-purpose
symbol processing (Langlois 1986). “Rationality” is bounded because it cannot
reach the correct analytical solution to a complex but well-defined problem (like
winning in chess). And heuristics are therefore inferior or second-best solutions.
To many writers on the cognitive foundations of behavior, this formulation has
its eye to the wrong end of the telescope. Far from being inferior shortcuts to a
general analytical solution, the rules humans follow may in fact represent a
mode of approaching complex problems superior to that of general-purpose

reality. Some elements of the stock of knowledge are so fundamental that they are not
merely non-conscious but are actually “a condition of every experience in the life-world and
enter into the horizon of experience” (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, p. 104). Dennett (1998, p.
188) has suggested extending phenomenology into “hetero-phenomenology,” which would
consider the demands of action not from the perspective of what is introspectively given to
humans but from the perspective of the pure information demands of action.
24

A heuristic is “any principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average search
to solution” (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1962, p. 85).
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axiomatic symbol processing. In their seminal discussion of skills, routines, and
capabilities, Nelson and Winter (1982) invoke Simon’s notion of heuristics as an
example of a routine. But they move quickly to locate the ideas of skill and
routine more firmly in the phenomenology of Simon’s intellectual opponents.
Skills, in the end, are inexplicit rules connected to specific human performances.
They are tacit knowledge, in Michael Polanyi’s (1958) famous phrase.
Evolutionary psychology hints at why this is so. For many evolutionary
psychologists, the physiological basis for human cognitive ability resides in the
fact that the brain is the result of layers of historical evolution and thus consists
not in a single central-processing unit (as in a von Neumann-style computer) but
rather in a congeries of interacting organs or faculties each “designed” by
evolution for a different role.25 In computer terms, the brain is not a powerful
CPU with a few simple support chips but rather a system of powerful but
specialized co-processors governed by a relatively weak CPU. It is still unclear
exactly how all of this works. And there is considerable controversy over what
we may call the strong program of evolutionary psychology, namely, that much
(most? all?) of human behavior can be explained in terms of specific hard-wired
modules or faculties that evolved in specific evolutionary environments. But
even researchers skeptical of the strong program are increasingly inclined to see
the brain not as a pure engine of calculation but as a “layered, hybrid modern
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mind [that] is capable of experiencing, learning, knowing, and problem-solving,
at all levels, sometimes employed at the same time, but in different ways”
(Nelson and Nelson 2002, pp. 723-4).

The future of work.
The view from cognitive science informs our discussion in a number of ways. It
is far from implausible, for example, to entertain the hypothesis that the
evolutionary environment in which our ancestors found themselves may offer
clues to the cognitive strengths and weaknesses of present-day humans as pieces
of the productive system. Hunter-gatherers were clearly adaptors and creative
problem solvers. They were highly skilled in the sense developed earlier: they
needed to know many different routines and had the ability to switch among
tasks. Surely most of the cognitive background assumptions of our ancestors’s
environment carry over to our own at all but the most superficial levels: objects
still tend to fall down not up, etc. Thus, an information-processing system that is
highly specialized and domain specific along a computational dimension
becomes a general-purpose technology along an economic dimension. Human
beings can do all sorts of things competently and flexibly, albeit at low rates of
throughput. They are thus well suited to a wide range of tasks with similar

25

And, if Antonio Damasio (1994) is right, organs and systems outside of the brain proper are
also part of the cognitive process — of the mind.
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cognitive profiles, from driving trucks to repairing trucks to running the
Teamsters Union. Humans are natural “buffers.”
At another level, the view from cognitive science suggests something
about machines as well. In effect, nature solves the frame problem by enlisting
the division of labor. Human “common sense” arises from specialization to the
contours and demands of a specific environment. Moreover, the evolution of
flexible cognition is the exception not the rule (Pinker 1977, p. 154). Nature’s
tendency on the whole is to create idiots-savants not general-purpose problem
solvers: lightning-fast cheetahs, bats that echolocate, birds that navigate by the
stars.26 The human brain itself may be a congeries of specialized idiots-savants
who work together. So we as humans should not see it as odd that all we seem
to be able to create are machines that do a narrow set of things well.
It makes good economic sense for machines to be idiots-savants, for the
reasons Smith explained.

Moreover, as robotics research has revealed, it is

almost always cheaper to change the environment so that it demands less
flexibility than it is to create an adaptation to a complex environment. If we want
high throughput, we are well advised to stabilize the environment and simplify
the computational demands of the task structure.

If you want a personal

computer built to your specifications, you can wander into your local mom-and-
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In this and in earlier passages I have lapsed into the rhetorical trope of nature as designer.
Of course I don’t mean that literally, and the reader should take this locution as
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pop computer shop, where the proprietor can no doubt be induced to order the
necessary parts and put them together for you. But if you want to produce
personal computers to specification at extremely high volumes and significantly
lower costs, you are far better off setting up an automated production and
distribution system of the sort pioneered by Dell (Kraemer and Dedrick 2001).
The Dell system won’t enquire about your grandchildren (unless some wag
programs the website to do that), nor will it go home and fry up an egg for its
son’s supper. But the point is that we shouldn’t want it to.
Just as the human being is a general-purpose technology precisely because
of its cognitive specialization, the computer is an idiot-savant because of its
cognitive generality. Of course, the computer is a general-purpose technology in
economic terms, since it can be reprogrammed easily to take on a wide variety of
specialized computational tasks (Langlois 2002). Giving a computer common
sense is hard, but through software we can make computers into virtually any
idiot-savant we choose. And that is exactly what we should want to do.
Even in the age of computers, high-throughput production is about
altering the environment to reduce variation. In Ford’s original version of the
assembly line, everything was pre-programmed so that square pegs always
appeared to match every square hole; eliminating variation meant eliminating

incorporating by reference a wholly Darwinian account of the sort so well expounded by
Richard Dawkins (1986)
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round pegs not just whales and bowls of petunias.

This is why it was an

important part of Ford’s manufacturing concept that the product be identical so
as to permit as high a throughput at as low a cost as possible. At least since the
jacquard loom, however, batch processing has actually been able to handle
certain kinds of variety rather easily. So long as variety is predictable — that is,
so long as variety means a selection from a restricted set of known possibilities —
machines can be taught to recognize and deal with it.

To resurrect some

terminology I proposed a long time ago (Langlois 1984), I will describe this as
parametric variation — variation from within a known set mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive possibilities.

Any other kind of variation I will call

structural variation.27 Distinguishing among square, round, and triangular pegs
is a parametric matter. Dealing with whales and bowls of petunias is a structural
matter. Computers like those in the Dell production system have lowered the
cost of managing parametric variation. You can choose from a wide menu of
processors, memory, drives, etc.; but if it’s not on the menu, you can’t have it.
It is for fundamentally economic reasons, then, that we should continue to
see machines crowd humans out of tasks in which computers have comparative
advantage, namely tasks involving predictable, repetitive sequences of activities,
including potentially complex but well structured calculations. This also implies
that humans will crowd into activities in which humans have comparative
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Metin Coşgel and I (1993) argue that this distinction actually tracks Frank Knight’s more
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advantage, namely tasks involving flexibility and adaptability, especially in the
areas of problem solving and perceptual-motor activities.
In her study of how information technology has altered the organization
of work, Shoshana Zuboff (1988) shows that this process has been going on for
some time.

Interestingly, this is especially clear in the realm of symbol-

processing tasks like management and office work, where the need for judgment
and buffering has long been moving up the hierarchy.
Elements of managerial work most easily subjected to
rationalization were “carved out” of the manager’s activities. The
foundational example of this process is the rationalization of
executive work, which was accomplished by ejecting those
elements that could be explicated and systematized, preserving
intact the skills that comprise executive craft. It was the carving out
of such elements that created the array of functions we now
associate with middle management. A similar process accounts for
the origins of clerical work. In each case, the most easily
rationalized features of the activities at one level were carved out,
pushed downward, and used to create wholly new lower-level
jobs. In this process higher-level positions were not eliminated; on
the contrary, they came to be seen more than ever as the depository
of the organization’s skills. (Zuboff 1988, p. 98.)
Although perhaps less obvious at first, change in mechanical tasks has followed
a similar trajectory. The division of labor tends to make tasks more routine and
therefore to “deskill” those who undertake those tasks. But, as we saw, that very
routinization enables “skilled” integrative machines to displace those deskilled
workers. It is such machinery (rather than to specialized humans) to which the

famous (and widely misunderstood) distinction between risk and uncertainty.
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most easily rationalized tasks are ultimately “ejected,” leaving humans the more
discretionary tasks of tending, maintenance, and design in which they have
cognitive comparative advantage.
Both Simon (1997) and Zuboff cite a study of worker attitudes by Robert
Blauner (1964) that examined four kinds of industries: crafts (printing), fordist
assembly (automobiles), machine tending (textiles), and continuous-process
(chemicals). As one might expect, workers found fordist assembly and machine
tending less pleasant than crafts production; but not so continuous-process
production. In that type of industry, mechanization had proceeded farther, and
machines had taken over most of the routine activities, leaving workers the more
interesting – more crafts-like – tasks of maintenance and problem solving.
Blauner is right to see continuous process technology as the future of
mechanization. Because of their cognitive comparative advantage, machines are
likely to continue to absorb routine and well-defined tasks, thereby becoming
more integrated and thus making production more continuous.
The process of crowding humans into tasks suitable for human cognition
is not confined to the shop floor or the interior of the firm. Within the larger
market economy, we ought to expect the same general phenomenon. Simon
envisioned humans filling a variety of roles.
•

Lower-level buffering workers. These would include workers in
small-scale tasks requiring human hand-eye-brain coordination.
- 33 -

Such tasks would include routine or repetitive activities not worth
automating or costly to automate. (The American system of road
transport, designed for human drivers, comes to mind.)
•

Maintenance workers, including those engaged in preventive
maintenance. Someone has to clean up the mess when a whale or a
bowl of petunias comes down the assembly line.

•

Bosses. These are a kind of maintenance worker — people who
deal with and plan for the non-routine. Simon notes, quite rightly,
that redesign of production and mechanization is likely to lead to
less need for management as “supervision.”

•

Designers, which includes not only designers of products and
processes but also managers at the highest levels, who are
designers of organizations.

•

Those involved in personal-service occupations, who have to deal
with the most unpredictable environment of all — other humans.
Which occupations remain personal-service ones will depend,
however, on which can be more cheaply redesigned to eliminate
variation. In banking, automated tellers reduced the number of
human tellers. But in the restaurant business, the automat of the
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1950s failed miserably in displacing what we now refer to as the
“waitperson.”
Simon seems to suggest that, as automation proceeds, humans will progressively
shift down this list, away from not-yet-automated assembly tasks and routine
maintenance and into design, management, and personal service.

Voilà the

service economy, already clearly envisioned forty years ago.
Will this be a better place? Clearly this sort of analysis cannot answer a
question of such weight and complexity. But it does arguably cast light on one
important aspect. Even the most routine sorts of jobs into which humans are
likely to be shunted — like truck drivers or hairdressers — are clearly crafts
occupations in the sense described earlier. They require the operative to switch
among a wide set of routines and tasks, and they present that operative with a
wide variety of stimuli. This speaks directly to one of the crucial considerations
in the debate about technology: the issue of cognitive narrowing that so troubled
Adam Smith and many others.

Indeed, the present analysis would argue

strongly against any criticism of mechanization aimed fundamentally at the
issues of task narrowing or deskilling.
Of course, one could always conjure up unpleasant visions of a future
knowledge economy (as the service economy is now called) on other grounds. In
his cyber-punk short story ”The Beautiful and the Sublime,” Bruce Sterling (1989)
gives us a future in which the advance of automation has moved the domain of
- 35 -

human tasks so far down Simon’s list that artists and aesthetes have become the
rising dominant class. This is not necessarily all to the good, if the shallow and
self-absorbed narrator and his friends are meant to be representative. Or maybe
Simon is right in this as well: “perhaps more of us will be salesmen” (Simon
1960, p. 38).
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